How to Spend Scarce Time When Resources Are Abundant
Using real options to choose which business opportunities deserve attention
In this article
Give a business enough money, capable people, and inexpensive tools to pursue almost any reasonable idea. It will still face a hard limit: how many decisions the right people can make, how many relationships they can develop, and how many commitments they can carry through.
As execution gets cheaper, more projects clear the financial hurdle. The queue for attention can grow faster than the organization’s ability to handle it. A campaign is affordable. So is another product experiment. So is another market. Each arrives with a claim on someone’s calendar.
That changes the investment question. What additional value will this next use of time create, and what will lose that time if we say yes?
This is where options thinking becomes useful. An early investment can buy information and preserve a later choice. A larger commitment should follow only when the evidence and the competing demands on capacity justify it.
At Redline Growth, I began exploring this by treating sales opportunities as options on future customer relationships. A recent comparison of website inquiries, conference dinners, webinar attendees, and procurement signals made the practical question concrete: how much effort does each opportunity deserve? That question applies just as readily to product development, partnerships, acquisitions, and leadership itself.
What options thinking adds
An option gives its holder a choice about a future commitment. Its value depends partly on being able to respond to what happens before that commitment becomes necessary.
Black–Scholes provides a precise financial model under specific assumptions about markets, asset dynamics, and hedging. Business opportunities rarely meet those assumptions. A prospect’s supposed option price is therefore a managerial estimate, not a tradable market value. [1]
The practical business application is real options: structure an investment so that what you learn can change whether you expand, wait, or stop. [2]
Consider a new market. You could fund a full launch immediately. You could also commission a small demand test, speak with prospective buyers, and make the larger investment conditional on what you learn. That initial work may be valuable even if the eventual decision is to walk away.
On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to view the full table.
| Option concept | Business question |
|---|---|
| Potential payoff | What contribution could this opportunity create, including credible follow-on opportunities? |
| Initial investment | What must we spend now to learn or preserve access? |
| Later commitment | What additional money and scarce human time would pursuing it require? |
| Expiration | When will the opportunity disappear or materially change? |
| Flexibility | Can we genuinely stop, redirect, or increase our investment? |
Two different kinds of time belong in the analysis. Calendar time determines how long the opportunity remains available. Working time measures how much constrained attention the opportunity consumes. A decision can expire tomorrow and take twenty minutes. Another can remain open for a year and consume a month of leadership time.
The attractive combination is uncertain upside, useful learning, and a real ability to limit further commitment. Uncertainty alone is insufficient. A pilot that creates lasting customer obligations or requires a full implementation before it teaches you anything can be much more expensive than its budget suggests.
Value what the next action changes
A valuable opportunity does not automatically deserve more of your time. It may already be progressing well. Another meeting might barely improve the outcome. A less obvious opportunity may respond strongly to the same attention.
For an action that primarily changes the probability of success, a useful starting calculation is the improvement in that probability multiplied by the contribution if successful, less the additional costs of the action.
Use contribution after delivery costs, rather than revenue. Compare against the realistic baseline: what your existing team and process would do without this particular intervention. If the action changes contract size, timing, retention, or delivery cost, compare the complete scenarios instead of reducing everything to a win probability.
Here is a hypothetical example. Both opportunities already have teams working on them. The decision is whether to add executive involvement. All cash figures use the same valuation horizon, and the additional pursuit costs exclude the executive hours shown separately.
On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to view the full table.
| Assumption | Large opportunity | Smaller opportunity |
|---|---|---|
| Contribution if won | $1,000,000 | $300,000 |
| Win probability without executive involvement | 20% | 10% |
| Win probability with executive involvement | 25% | 20% |
| Expected contribution added | $50,000 | $30,000 |
| Additional cash pursuit cost | $10,000 | $2,000 |
| Net expected contribution added | $40,000 | $28,000 |
| Executive time required | 10 hours | 2 hours |
| Added contribution per executive hour | $4,000 | $14,000 |
The larger opportunity offers the greater absolute benefit from executive involvement. The smaller one uses that executive’s time much more efficiently.
Suppose the executive has ten discretionary hours. Other feasible work can absorb the unused hours and is expected to add $5,000 of contribution per hour. Spending all ten hours on the large opportunity adds $40,000. Spending two on the smaller opportunity and eight on the alternative adds $68,000. That also beats spending all ten hours on the alternative, which would add $50,000.
The $5,000 is the estimated value of the work being displaced. Economists call that a shadow price. It comes from the best feasible alternative use of capacity, rather than the executive’s salary. It can change with the week, the role, and the opportunities available.
A value-per-hour ratio is useful for screening. The actual decision still requires comparing combinations that fit the calendar. Projects can be indivisible, share dependencies, or compete for the same specialist. Ten attractive initiatives may all need the same person in their second week.
The estimates also need honest ranges. A weighted lead score is not automatically a probability, and a confident-looking decimal is not evidence. If plausible changes to the inputs reverse the decision, identify the uncertain input that matters most before investing in a more elaborate model.
The same signal can justify different amounts of attention
The original sales examples make the distinction concrete. A website inquiry, dinner conversation, webinar attendance, and procurement signal each reveal something different. Their usefulness depends on what action remains available.
On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to view the full table.
| Signal | A useful next decision | What to avoid assuming |
|---|---|---|
| Website inquiry | Respond and qualify the actual problem and timing. | Another senior meeting necessarily improves a process already working. |
| Conference dinner | Follow up on the specific conversation and test whether a relevant project exists. | A good conversation proves a funded buying process. |
| Webinar attendance | Check fit and stronger evidence before assigning intensive follow-up. | Attendance alone warrants substantial seller time. |
| Pre-RFP evidence | Investigate a credible need early enough to understand the opportunity. | An early signal guarantees a purchase or a favorable selection. |
| Published RFP | Make a disciplined bid or no-bid decision using requirements, fit, access, and pursuit cost. | A clear buying event guarantees that our effort can materially improve the odds. |
These are possible plays, not a universal ranking. A live request for proposal can be excellent business. It can also demand a large response effort when the selection criteria leave little room for your team to improve its position.
Earlier evidence may create more room to learn, build access, or shape a useful response. That advantage depends on the actual situation. Purchase probability and the value of your intervention are different quantities.
The same reasoning applies outside sales. A product team should ask what a prototype will change about its launch decision. A partnership team should ask whether a meeting can create access it does not already have. A value-creation team should compare initiatives against the shared operators and specialists required to execute them.
Buy information when it can change the decision
Some actions improve the outcome directly. Others improve the decision about whether to pursue it. Treat those benefits separately.
Decision theory calls the second benefit the value of information. The comparison is the expected result of making the best decision after receiving new evidence versus making the best decision with what you know now. Then subtract the cost of obtaining and evaluating that evidence, including any loss from delay. [3]
A second hypothetical example shows why this matters. A launch would produce $100,000 in a favorable market and lose $30,000 in an unfavorable one. Those outcomes already include all launch costs and the opportunity cost of the downstream constrained time. You estimate a 25% chance of the favorable market.
Launching now has an expected value of $2,500: 25% of $100,000 plus 75% of negative $30,000. Passing has a value of zero.
Now suppose a market test detects a favorable market 80% of the time and returns a false positive in an unfavorable market 10% of the time. It costs $3,000 plus two hours of scarce attention. Value those hours at $1,000 each, based on their alternative use.
The policy is to launch only after a positive result. Under these assumptions, the favorable-market-and-positive-test branch contributes $20,000 in expected value: 25% × 80% × $100,000. The unfavorable-market-and-positive-test branch subtracts $2,250: 75% × 10% × $30,000. Negative results lead to passing.
That produces $17,750 before the test’s $5,000 total cost, or $12,750 afterward. Testing improves expected value by $10,250 compared with launching immediately.
This assumes the opportunity survives the test without other deterioration. It also assumes the test measures something predictive of commercial success. A convincing demo or enthusiastic survey response may not establish that customers will buy.
Before approving research, write the decision it could change. For example: if buyers will fund a pilot at the proposed price, proceed; if they only express interest in a free trial, redesign the offer. If every plausible result leads to the same action, the research has no information value for that decision. It may have some other benefit, which should be stated separately.
Preserve the ability to stop. A team that has effectively committed to rollout before a pilot begins has removed much of the pilot’s value. And when expansion, abandonment, and learning are already represented in the scenarios, adding a separate ‘optionality premium’ counts the same benefit twice.
Give every opportunity a clock
Waiting has an economic effect. A customer may need an answer now. A hiring candidate may accept another role. A procurement deadline may close. A competitor may establish the relationship while your team commissions another report.
For each opportunity, ask when the next action must happen and whether the information you are seeking can arrive in time to be useful. Sometimes another day of research improves the decision. Sometimes it removes the decision entirely.
Monitoring should therefore have a trigger. ‘Revisit if a budget owner is appointed’ is useful. ‘Keep an eye on this’ can become a recurring claim on attention with no decision attached.
Already-incurred research costs belong in the evaluation of the overall program. They should not force the next commitment. At each new stage, compare the remaining costs and benefits with the alternatives still available.
Use abundant resources to reduce the attention required
If money and execution capacity are plentiful, use them to reduce the amount of constrained attention each decision needs. Hire the specialist, improve the handoff, establish decision rights, or automate a repeatable step. The constraint may be partly a result of how the organization is designed.
Count the complete workload. Delegation includes setup, coordination, review, and rework. An inexpensive agent that creates forty reports has created a new problem if someone important must read all forty.
Herbert Simon argued that information consumes the attention of its recipients. He also proposed that a useful information system should reduce the attention demanded from the rest of the organization by filtering and condensing what it receives. [4]
Applied to AI workflows, my test is straightforward: does this system improve the decisions enough to justify the attention it consumes? Can it produce a recommendation with the evidence, uncertainty, deadline, and next action the decision-maker needs? Can it leave low-value material out of the queue?
Sometimes the highest-value use of a leader’s afternoon is to change a process so that fifty future decisions no longer require that leader. Evaluate that redesign as an investment, including the effort to establish reliable judgment and the decisions that still need escalation.
Some constraints sit outside your organization. A buyer still has limited time to evaluate an offer, and a partner has limited time to build a relationship. Producing more material can increase the burden on the person whose attention you need.
Recovered hours need an intended use. They might support more customer work, avoid an additional hire, or create a shorter working week. Do not count the same hours as all three benefits.
Run a portfolio of decisions
Start by protecting existing commitments and essential operating work. Allocate the remaining capacity across opportunities. A contractual obligation or critical maintenance task cannot simply disappear because a new project has a higher projected return.
For each discretionary opportunity, create a short decision record. It should state the outcome sought, the realistic baseline, the next proposed action, the contribution that action could add, the cash and constrained hours required, the evidence that would change the decision, and the relevant deadline. Name the work that would be displaced.
Then assign one of four actions:
- Act The available evidence justifies the commitment, and it fits the actual capacity available.
- Investigate A bounded test could change the decision and is worth its cost, attention, and delay.
- Monitor A specific future signal could make the opportunity actionable, and keeping it alive is inexpensive enough.
- Pass The next commitment is not justified. Record the reason so the same idea does not repeatedly return without new evidence.
Give each active item an owner, a time budget, and a date or trigger for the next decision. Include the downstream demand if it succeeds. A pilot that needs two hours this week and an unavailable technical lead next month has not yet earned a rollout.
Keep some capacity available for surprises. A calendar filled with acceptable projects leaves no room to exercise a better opportunity that appears tomorrow. The amount of slack should reflect how often such opportunities occur and how quickly they require action.
Make the estimates accountable. Track the predicted improvement, the hours actually consumed, the decision made, and the contribution eventually realized. Where practical, compare against a similar group using the existing approach. An account that closed after receiving attention does not prove that the attention caused the win.
Use those results to improve the next decision. If a type of research rarely changes the action, reduce it. If small tests repeatedly prevent expensive mistakes, preserve room for them. If a process produces more alerts while seller decisions remain unchanged, revisit the process.
What should earn the next hour
Abundant resources create more ways to act. Options thinking helps decide how much to commit before the next useful piece of evidence arrives.
The business case for an opportunity is incomplete until it explains why it deserves time that another opportunity will lose. A large addressable market, an impressive demo, or an enthusiastic buyer can support that case. None completes it.
Ask for the next action, what it can change, whose attention it requires, and when the choice expires. Then give the opportunity the amount of commitment the evidence has earned.
Sources
Vasily Strela. Risk Neutral Valuation and Black–Scholes Equation. MIT OpenCourseWare, 18.642, Fall 2024. Replicating portfolios, risk-neutral valuation, and the model’s assumptions. Return to reference [1]
Aswath Damodaran. Real Option Valuation. Chapter 5, NYU Stern. Learning, adaptive investment, expansion, abandonment, and delay. Return to reference [2]
Christopher Jackson and colleagues. A guide to value of information methods for prioritising research in health impact modelling. Epidemiologic Methods, 2021. The general decision-theoretic comparison used here is adapted to a business example. Return to reference [3]
Herbert A Simon. Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World. Original manuscript dated September 1, 1969, Carnegie Mellon University archive. Attention scarcity and information-system design. Return to reference [4]
